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take their share of asylum seekers from non-EU 
countries who entered the EU in Greece and Italy. 
Both costal countries of the EU have experienced the 
where a large majority (in Italy 96 percent) enters the 
EU in irregular way and many of them as economic 
migrants. In order to deal with the mass migration, 
the EU decided to relocate 120,000 asylum-seekers 
from Greece and Italy to other EU countries in 
September 2015, a decision vigorously contested 
by the V4. Most of asylum-seekers tend to cross the 
Mediterranean on smuggler boats and private NGO 
rescue ships from Libya to Italy. While the NGOs 
actions follow from humanitarian arguments, most 
of them refuse any democratic control by the EU 
and de facto acting against the will of large parts of 
the EU populations. This creates a conundrum in 
which both the EU and the individual EU Member 
On June 13, 2017, the European Commission — a 
supranational governing body of the European Union 
(EU) — initiated legal action against three of its 
Central Eastern European members which belong to 
the so-called Visegrád 4 group (V4). The V4 is a loose 
association of four Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) member states of the EU: Poland, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, all of which joined 
the EU in 2004. While the group was established in 
1991, it was only in the aftermath of the 2015 EU 
refugee and migration crisis that the V4 formed a 
more visible interest group within the 28-member 
states’ EU aiming mainly at the thwarting of the 
EU’s refugee relocation scheme. The EU frequently 
undertakes legal action against its own member states 
drag their feet on the implementation of the EU law in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic has been initiated 
because the V4 (minus Slovakia) have refused to 
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the humanitarian prescriptions and the wish of the EU 
populations to control the EU borders and to have a 
the ground including the migration issue.
1. The European Union and its irregular 
mass-immigration crisis
The EU procedure against the V4 represents, after 
the Brexit referendum the next complex issue 
manifesting deep disagreements within the EU, with 
potential consequences for the bloc’s coherence. 
Some V4 politicians and parts of the CEE populations 
view the EU’s migrants’ relocation agreement as 
a forced transformation of CEE societies towards 
multi- religious societies (fearing that it might 
increase the chances of Islamist terrorism), favoring 
even an exit of their countries from the EU if the 
agreement is imposed by the European Commission. 
Other segments of the V4 populations instead want 
the V4 governments to agree at least partially since 
they see the EU membership as more vital for their 
country, both economically and politically, than any 
long-term cultural shift possibly connected with the 
acceptance of mass migration of non-indigenous 
cultures and religions. While the issue is splitting the 
already highly polarized CEE societies even further, 
it is also generating strong anti-EU sentiment in the 
in turn perceives the V4 nations as still not fully at 
the EU-level regarding their democratic cultures. The 
case suggests: If the issue of irregular mass migration 
solved, the EU’s falling apart might no longer be just 
a pessimist projection. The migration and refugee 
future.
issue and its weight for the further development of 
Europe, it is necessary to explain the basics of the 
current political constellation.
The V4 has a low degree of institutionalization and has 
been of marginal political relevance for the European 
Union for years. However, it recently became more 
critique of Hungary and Poland,1  and second in the 
course of the European migration crisis since 2015, 
as the V4 countries revolted against the EU refugee 
and migration policies time and time again. While the 
revolt might be partially due to the rising populism 
in the whole EU including CEE, there are political 
arguments used by the V4 that have been part of the 
political discourse on migration in the EU for years 
critics both in the V4 and in other major EU countries 
such as Italy and Great Britain has been formulated:
refugees in its immigration policy, thus blurring the 
procedures proposed by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Migration (UNHCR). This applies 
to some EU countries more than others, as the rates of 
the member states (e.g. in Bulgaria 65 percent and in 
Estonia and Portugal 0 percent);2
between multi-cultural and multi-religious societal 
1 Ireneusz P. Karolewski and Roland Benedikter (2016) Poland’s conservative turn and the role of the European Union. European Political 
Science, 2016, 1-20, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-016-0002-x.
2 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics.
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visions which in reality, as a variety of studies suggest 
such as, for example, the 2017 Chatham House Report 
on Islamic Immigration,3 may make a substantial 
this view, multi- religious countries such as the UK, 
France, Belgium and Germany are more often subject 
to religious terrorism than other countries;
(3) the European Union regulations provide also 
irregular immigrants immediately with the full social 
rights of a European citizen (until their status is 
issue for some EU citizens, as many countries of 
the bloc have been in deep recession, showed high 
unemployment and followed austerity policy imposed 
by the EU (e.g. Greece and Italy). The normative 
position of the EU on refugees and migrants shifted 
countries already in dire straits to the edge of their 
policy occurs largely from the national budgets. In 
particular, the Southern European countries found 
themselves squeezed between the austerity pressure 
by the EU and the migration pressure from outside;
application of the law as required by the bloc’s own rule 
of law principles. For instance, the EU Commissioner 
Dimitris Avramopoulos has stated repeatedly since 
2013 that in the EU international asylum laws are 
since the large majority of rejected applicants, i.e. 
those having no right to asylum, are not deported 
as requested by law, but simply left living in the EU 
without any concrete plan or vision except a rather 
4  Most European Union 
communications regarding the long-term perspective 
countries (represented by conservative governments), 
this is due to a leftist-liberal political correctness 
which has been dominating the EU for years and is 
preferring (widely indiscriminate) migration over 
the protection of the EU’s outer borders and the 
application of the rule of law in the strict sense. 
(5) As a consequence, the EU ignores the relevance 
Union’s member states, including particularly highly 
vulnerable minority protection areas such as the 
Autonomous Province of South Tyrol with its only 
400,000 Austrian and Raeto-Roman native minorities 
within the Italian national state with its 60 million 
population. Italy and other EU nations have not been 
mass immigration might have to such special areas with 
a very high vulnerability factor (VUCA factor). These 
areas have not by chance been hitherto protected, as in 
the case of South Tyrol by Italian constitutional law, to 
preserve their particular ethnic character. In this view, 
instead of providing these areas with special quota of 
refugees and migrants, the EU de facto forces them to 
behave like full nation-states and to accept numbers 
of migrants that might destabilize their peaceful, 
3 Matthew Goodwin, Thomas Raines and David Cutts (2017) What Do Europeans Think About Muslim Immigration? Chatham House 
Research Report, February 7, 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/what-do-europeans-think-about-muslim-immigration.
4 Luis R. Miranda: European Commission calls for Expulsion of 1 million Immigrants. , March 2, 2017, http://real-
agenda.com/european-commission-expulsion-immigrants/. Cf. Nikolaj Nielsen: EU wants rejected migrants, including minors, locked 
up. EUobserver, 02 March 2017, https://euobserver.com/migration/137088 and Siobhan McFadyen: European migrant crisis escalates 
as Malta calls for ways to send back more arrivals. Sunday Express, January 27, 2017, http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/759529/ 
European-migrant-crisis-escalates-Malta-conference-deportation-camps.
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post-national ethnic coexistence concept.5 In the most 
burdened EU member nation, Italy, only a third to a 
half of all 300,000 illegally entering migrants arriving 
per year (not counting those who are unregistered, 
and those who arrive by legal ways) do submit an 
asylum request at all, since they know they have no 
right to stay according to the asylum laws, and of 
those submitting an asylum request 96% are rejected 
and only 4-5% are recognized as refugees, and thus 
as allowed to legally stay on Italian (EU) soil.6 All 
others seem to be economic migrants, rather than 
refugees – although the EU authorities over the past 
years have tended in practice to blur the lines between 
One essential point of critique in this context is that 
the EU was inclined to treat both categories from day 
one on equally like full EU citizens with regard to 
most social services and rights. According to critics, 
this does not only devalue the notion of European 
Union citizenship, since in contrast to countries such 
as Australia, Canada or Switzerland, services have not 
been substantially tied to a gradual system of access, 
based on adaptation, integration and merit. This also 
poses a challenge to the EU’s own rule of law, since 
according to critics very few of the estimated more 
than 1 million, who do not formally have the right to 
stay in the EU, have ever been deported.7 
Non-deportation has however become a core problem 
which undermines the credibility and, de facto, 
the legitimacy of the EU asylum laws. The failed 
migrants has led to the application of EU asylum 
request is applied, but not the second: the deportation 
absent in the migration law, neither at the EU nor at 
the national level, has been viewed by an increasing 
number of citizens (in particular in the most burdened 
EU states like Italy and Greece) as a core fallacy of 
the EU governance discrediting not only its practices 
of migration policy but also posing a challenge to 
the bloc’s legitimacy and giving rise to the so-called 
Euroscepticism. In 2016 and 2017, European citizens 
saw the migration crisis as the biggest threat to the EU, 
even ahead of terrorism. While an average majority 
of EU citizens expected a common EU solution to 
the challenge (68%), the response depends strongly 
on the position of the citizens within the society and 
varies across the member states. For instance, 92% 
response’, while only 35% of the working class 
were in favor of it.8  Even before the outbreak of the 
migration crisis, in Germany only 29% had a positive 
opinion of immigration from non-EU countries in 
2015, while a relative majority (45%) supported a 
political response on both the EU and the national 
level. In 2015, Germans were more critical to the non-
EU migration than the average EU opinion (57%) 
but in some other EU countries the opposition to 
immigration from outside of the EU was even higher: 
5 Cf. Thomas Benedikter: Immigration in South Tyrol and its impact on the protection of the autochthonous national minorities. Szekler 
, September 29, 2005, http://sznt.sic.hu/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=191:immigration-in- 
south-tyrol-and-its-impact-on-the-protection-of-the-autochthonous-national-minorities&catid=18:cikkek-tanulmanyok&Itemid=24.
6 Paolo Lami: Immigrazione, ecco la verità: 40,000 richieste d'asilo, solo il 4% sono rifugiati. In: Il Secolo d'Italia, 8 giugno 2016, http://
www.secoloditalia.it/2016/06/ immigrazione-verita-40mila-richieste-dasilo-4- rifugiati/.
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Italy (75%), Latvia (79%) and Slovakia (74%).9 
2. The V4 Group and the contested 
European Union relocation scheme
contested debate, the European Commission’s legal 
three of the four nations, i.e. Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic for refusing to take their share of 
refugees based on the controversial European Union 
relocation scheme. Nevertheless, the fourth V4 nation 
Slovakia has also been one of the most fervent critics 
of the relocation scheme. 
If the three Visegrád countries do not change their 
opposition, EU sanctions could follow – which could 
in turn deepen the ongoing crisis of the European 
Union, given the controversial nature of the issue 
across the EU member states and within the EU 
the current high degree of frustration in the EU central 
the bulk of the EU member states to the EU migration 
agreements. It also manifests the general policy 
10 
In addition, the V4 countries criticize the quasi-
repressive character of the EU’s compulsory 
relocation scheme of September 2015. On 22 
September 2015, the EU interior ministers decided 
to introduce compulsory quota to resettle 120,000 
migrants from Greece and Italy, the main coastal 
EU countries, subject to the biggest refugee pressure 
throughout 2015 and 2016. The decision was taken 
by majority vote, with the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania and Slovakia voting against and Finland 
abstaining. The majority vote was controversial, 
since the EU uses majority voting rarely regarding 
formally allowed.
Poland initially accepted the EU resettlement 
decision provoking criticism from other V4 countries 
for undermining their unity. Earlier in September 
2015, leaders of the V4 had declared in Prague that 
they would not agree to any compulsory long-term 
quota on redistribution of immigrants following the 
statement of the German Foreign Minister Frank-
should seriously consider to use the instrument of 
11 
Since then, the relocation plan has remained 
controversial, as almost all of the EU countries 
accepting its entire share. The scheme is based on the 
continuous pledging of a certain number of refugees 
and their resettlement by every participating country, 
without Denmark, Ireland and the UK that have 
so-called opt-outs from the EU’s migration policy, 
negotiated with the EU Treaty.
The examples of failed policy implementation 
abound. As of July 2017, Austria had not accepted 
any refugees in the framework of the plan but had 
pledged to accept 50 refugees from Italy in the 
future, and Slovakia had accepted 16 refugees from 
Greece. Both are migrant-skeptical countries and 
9 
10 Massimo Bordignon and Simone Moriconi (2017) The case for a common European refugee policy. Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 
No. 8/2017, http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/PC-08-2017.pdf.
11 The Telegraph: Eastern European countries may be forced accept quotas for migrants. Germany’s foreign minister says it may consider 
co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11873936/Eastern-European-countries-may-be-forced-accept-quotas-for-migrants.html.
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did so clearly to avoid the infringement procedure, 
while the EU has been consistently criticizing Vienna 
and Bratislava for their rather modest engagement. 
While in 2017 Austria is ranked among the OECD’s 
globally most burdened nations in terms of migration 
more commitment, Slovakia considers itself a 
country too small and historically inapt to become a 
on many occasions. Hungary has never made a 
pledge, while Poland made one pledge in December 
2015, but changed its position as a result of terrorist 
attacks in Paris, Brussels and Berlin (and a change 
of government to a more conservative one in October 
2015). By summer 2017, the Czech Republic has 
accepted 12 refugees from Greece but had made no 
new pledges since May 2016. Until now, Hungary 
and Poland remained the only countries that have not 
accepted any refugees within the relocation scheme 
with other countries having accepted only a symbolic 
number of refugees and migrants.
3. The European Union’s infringement 
procedure against the V4 Group and 
the resulting predicament between 
Western and Eastern EU member 
states
reverted to the instrument of the law infringement 
instance, in 2008, the EU initiated a similar procedure 
against Greece. Athens was criticized for the lack of 
of asylum applications, which became a problem in 
particular after the transfer of asylum seekers from 
another member state to Greece under the Dublin 
regulation. The Dublin regulation stipulates that in 
principle asylum-seekers will be returned to the EU 
country in which they entered the EU territory for the 
processing their asylum application. Also, there was a 
similar procedure against Germany in 2012, as Berlin 
was dragging its feet with the implementation of the 
third country migration into the EU. Both procedures 
were successful, as Athens and Berlin adopted the 
necessary legal adjustments and never questioned the 
legality of the procedure.
In contrast, the current infringement procedure is 
and interfering with the realm of national sovereignty 
on the one hand. On the other hand, the procedure 
response to the relocation scheme, not just in the 
Central Eastern European (CEE) area but in all EU 
countries. While the initial aim of 120,000 refugees 
to be relocated was not very ambitious, only around 
33,000 asylum seekers have been moved by January 
2018.12
Western EU member states. While in 2017 Austria 
has relocated no refugees at all, France had still to 
take in 15,015 refugees (out of the agreed 19,714), 
Germany 18,548 (out of the agreed 27,536), Sweden 
1,091 (out of the agreed 3,766) and the Netherlands 
3,431 (out of the agreed 5,947).13 As of 25 January, 
Austria relocated only 29 refugees from Italy (and 
12 
legal_migration_en.pdf 
13 European Council (2017) Member State’s Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism (as of 19 October 2017): Scheme, https:// 
relocation_en.pdf 
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none from Greece), Czech Republic accepted only 12 
from Greece (and none from Italy), while Slovakia 
relocated only 16 refugees from Greece (and none 
from Italy). Hungary and Poland continue to reject 
refugees from the relocation scheme altogether.14 
One of the reasons for the rather lackluster response 
in all the EU (with the exception of Sweden) has 
been attributed mainly to the presidential elections 
in Austria in October/December 2016 and its 
general elections of November 2017, the elections 
in the Netherlands in April 2017, in France in April/
May 2017 and in Germany in October 2017, with 
the migration-critical parties in all these countries 
threatening to take over central political institutions 
such as the presidency (in Austria and France) or 
challenge the established parties (such as in the 
Netherlands and in Germany). In the federal elections 
in Germany, the rightist populist party AfD received 
12.6 per cent in September 2017, while in October 
2017 in Austria the rightist-conservative FPÖ gained 
26%, as both parties campaigned mainly with anti- 
immigration policies. Still, both anti-migration parties 
were in full compliance with the rules of democracy 
as stipulated by national and European laws, and both 
were not under observation neither by the EU nor by 
national democracy protection authorities, winning 
democratic elections at the ballot box. The popularity 
of both parties has been largely attributed to the EU’s 
mishandling of the refugee crisis. 
Against this backdrop, the EU seemed to be well aware 
of the highly politicized nature of the relocation scheme 
and how Eurosceptical parties may capitalize on it in 
order to shift political balances to the center and the 
center-right, i.e. towards more nationalist and partly 
Eurosceptical positions in most EU member nations. 
Nevertheless, the EU decided to make an example 
of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic which 
other countries to take the plan more seriously. Not 
taking any steps would be acknowledging a serious 
political failure of the bloc. The EU has already had a 
problem of credibility among its member states, as it 
concerning the rule of law violation in both countries, 
as for this the bloc would need an agreement of all 
member states (minus the countries in question) to 
impose concrete sanctions. Such an agreement is 
however highly improbable.15 
Despite the infringement procedure, the CEE 
governments remain critical of the relocation scheme, 
stressing that it was never working due to its ill- 
conceived nature, and – more important – that it 
constitutes a violation of basic EU law. There are 
four main arguments brought forward to sustain such 
position.
Firstly, according to Warsaw, Budapest and Prague, 
the refugee crisis, rather than solving it because 
the EU’s relocation plan would actually represent a 
pull factor, encouraging more migrants to come to 
Europe, thus contributing to a probable collapse of 
the entire Schengen zone, i.e. the principle of border- 
free movement within the EU, since many countries 
would start to re-introduce border controls to prevent 
irregular mass-migration which continues to get 
100,000s per year mainly to the shores of Italy across 
the Mediterranean. This argument highlights that the 
majority of the asylum-seekers from the MENA region 
14 
play_-_relocation_en.pdf
15 Robert Grzeszczak and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski (2017) Mind the Gap! Schwierigkeiten der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in der EU. 
Verfassungsblog, 26. September 2017, http://verfassungsblog.de/mind-the-gap-schwierigkeiten-der-rechtsstaatlichkeit-in-der-eu/. 
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coming to Europe in 2015 and 2016 were actually 
economic migrants targeting the wealthy welfare 
states of the EU such as Germany and Sweden, rather 
than the poorer ones such as Poland and Hungary.16 
This argument is also sustained by the fact that less 
than third of the 300,000-400,000 irregular migrants 
arriving in Italy per year submitted an asylum request 
at all since 2014. The migrants arrive with the help of 
the NGO ships, i.e. of private rescue organizations, 
controlled neither by the European member nations 
ships are able to professionally transfer around 1,000 
irregular migrants per day across the Mediterranean, 
which according to the Italian authorities contributes to 
makes business out of mass-migration to Europe 
worth around 35 billion US$ annually according to 
for Migration (IOM).17 
Secondly
the EU decision of September 2015 to establish 
forced relocation to be imposed to its member states 
was illegal, as, among others, the Council applied a 
majority decision instead of unanimity and did not 
years, the EU has applied a rule according to which 
with regard to highly controversial issues the member 
states would seek unanimity even though formally a 
majority decision might be possible. If, however, a 
controversial majority decision is enforced on others, 
18  This is a highly controversial 
issue pointing to broader discussion on whether the 
EU espouses a hegemonic structure of larger and 
more powerful states (e.g. France and Germany) at 
the expense of smaller and weaker member states.
, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
argue that since the bulk of the refugees prefer the 
welfare state countries such as Germany, Italy and 
Sweden who give them immediate and unrestricted 
contributions, they would prefer to leave the poorer 
ones such as Poland, Hungary and Romania after the 
resettlement anyway, and these countries would need 
to stop them against their will and thus violate the 
Geneva Convention.19 In this view, the mass migration 
to the EU was propelled by Germany that in 2015 
asylum applications in Germany, thus questioning the 
external EU borders.
Fourthly, according to the V4 there might be an 
increased threat of terrorism and organized crime as 
a result of the relocation scheme, as, for instance, IS 
particularly from Libya, Tunisia and Egypt across 
the Mediterranean to Italy and recruit young male 
16 
thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/311735,EU-%E2%80%98made-wrong-decision%E2%80%99-in-refugee-policy-Polish-FM. 
17 Axel Bugge: People smugglers make $35 billion a year on migrant crisis – International Organization for Migration (IOM) Head. 
Reuters, May 31, 2017, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-portugal-migration/people-smugglers-make-35-billion-a-year-on-migrant-crisis- 
iom-head-idUKKBN18R26J. In the eyes of critics, the name of the organization itself may be problematic, since it suggests that the IOM 
of the IOM and thus criticize a lack of neutrality and objectivity. 
18 The Blaze (2017) The EU threatens Poland for not accepting Muslim refugees — here’s how they responded, June 19, 2017, http://www. 
theblaze.com/news/2017/06/19/the-eu-threatens-poland-for-not-accepting-muslim-refugees-heres-how-they-responded/.
19 The Telegraph (2017) EU migration showdown: Divide deepens after Brussels launches legal action against Hungary, Poland and Czech 
Republic, June 13, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/13/eu-migration-showdown-divide-deepens-brussels-launches-legal/.
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refugees, many of whom come to Europe without any 
parental company.20  As the Italian authorities analyzed 
in July 2017, there were connections between terrorist 
criminal organization in Sicily and the Italian South 
who founded appropriate NGO’s to host the migrants 
in its own structures paid for by the state, i.e. making 
a business out of the Italian law that guarantees every 
migrant 35 Euro per day, i.e. 1,000 Euro per month 
which is more than many Southern Italian pensioners 
obtain after 40 years of work. According to the 
International Organization for Migration, irregular 
after the smuggling of drugs and weapons.21 Italian 
conservative commentators have long speculated 
that while most bigger other EU nations were hit 
and although Italy accepts the largest numbers of 
migrants by keeping its sea borders open and as 
ships carrying mass migrant waves, there have been 
no terror attacks in Italy exactly because due to this 
policy Italy serves as an easy entry and exit area from 
and into the EU for fundamentalists not interested in 
putting the status quo at risk by attacking the Italian 
peninsula. That is why the European Union relocation 
plan, according to Warsaw, Budapest and Prague, is 
dangerous and could endanger not only Europe as a 
whole, but also the national security of their member 
states in particular.
4. The future of the European Union’s 
migration predicament: Calling for 
solidarity instead of security?
on lacking solidarity of these countries. Moreover, 
Hungary’s government has been criticized by the 
EU for the domestic politicization of the migration 
crisis. While Hungary was the only V4 country on 
the migrant’s route and subject to the highest number 
of asylum applications in 2015 in the entire EU,22 it 
has been argued that government under Viktor Orbán 
intentionally stirred up anti-migration xenophobia 
in order to boost its ailing popularity at home. The 
23  In particular, 
the October 2016 referendum in Hungary on the EU 
relocation scheme was interpreted as an instrument of 
domestically exploiting the migration crisis.
Nevertheless, the Polish government has backed 
Budapest since October 2015. This is because the 
migration crisis has become a central issue also 
for the political discourse in Poland, even though 
Poland was not located on the Balkan migration 
route. Warsaw has become an adamant critic of the 
relocation scheme stressing its repressive nature and 
pointing out that migration policy is a prerogative 
of the member states, and that the redistribution 
mechanism is a way to attract more migrants. The 
Budapest-Warsaw axis raised suspicion that Warsaw 
20 UAWIRE (2017) Warsaw: Poland cannot take any more refugees since it already accepted more than 1.4 million migrants from Ukraine, 
June 28, 2017, http://uawire.org/news/poland-accepted-more-than-1-4-million-migrants-from-ukraine.
21 Quoted for example in: Tuesday Reitano: What Pricing Tells Us About the Nature of the Smuggling Business. We are trying to combat 
an industry that we refuse to properly analyze, says transnational crime expert Tuesday Reitano. She argues that more and better data 
, June 9, 2017, https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/ 
community/2017/06/09/what-pricing-tells-us-about-the-nature-of-the-smuggling-business.
22 BBC (2016) Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts, 4 March 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world- 
europe-34131911.
23 Aneta Zachová, Edit Zgut, Krzysztof Kokoszczynski and Zuzana Gabrizova (2017) Visegrád and migration: Few prospects for a change 
in position. Euractiv, 16 January 2017, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/visegrad-and-migration-few-prospects-for- 
a-change-in-position/.
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and Budapest play a blame game against Brussels to 
mobilize their supporters at home and to support each 
other within the EU mainly in the context of the rule 
of law criticism against both right-wing governments 
by the EU institutions.
But there is also the Czech Republic, which has been 
beyond any democratic backsliding critique so far. 
Even though the Czech Republic seems to be the least 
critical of all V4 countries, migration has become 
a dominant topic in the Czech political discourse, 
with the parliamentary elections that took place in 
October 2017. The position of Prague focuses on the 
protection of the EU borders, rather than the relocation 
of migrants, as the country sent its police units to 
Greece. The Czech Ministry of Interior argued that 
the relocation of refugees should not be obligatory, 
but rather more support should be given for the 
European Asylum Agency and the European Border 
and Coastal Guard Frontex.24 After the infringement 
procedure was initiated, Milan Chovanec, the Czech 
refugees and migrants forced upon his country would 
stay rather in the designated countries than move 
to the more prosperous countries in the West of the 
EU such as in particular the three largest Eurozone 
nations Germany, France and Italy.25
The V4 countries are not just critical of the 
relocation scheme domestically and at the EU level. 
Both Slovakia and Hungary (with later support 
of Poland) in turn sued the Council of the EU for 
relocation scheme. That is why the EU was facing 
two lawsuits on the same issue in parallel for 
some time showing the high level of controversy 
surrounding the issue. During a hearing on 10 May 
2017 at the Court of Justice of the European Union 
Hungary and Slovakia defended their refusal to 
accept refugees and migrants under the compulsory 
quota system against German and French arguments 
pertaining to European solidarity. The Polish envoy 
to the Court argued in addition that the accepting 
of the migrants poses a threat to national security.26 
The Hungarian lawsuit comprised a ten point-list 
of legal arguments highlighting that the decision 
to assign quotas was illegal under the EU law or 
violated formal EU procedures. One of the arguments 
relocation should end on 17 September 2017. Still, 
the consequences of the measures are long-term ones, 
as the migrants and refugees are supposed to stay in 
the assigned countries for a longer period of time and 
there is no working deportation mechanism in the EU 
to apply the law with those whose asylum request is 
refused. Thus, according to Poland and Hungary, the 
applied in this context.
Another point was a formal one, as the European 
Council failed to consult the European Parliament, 
after substantial changes were made to the text of 
the proposal. Also, Hungary criticized that the EU 
decision is contrary to the Geneva Convention, 
24 Ibid.
25 The Telegraph (2017) EU migration showdown: Divide deepens after Brussels launches legal action against Hungary, Poland and Czech 
Republic, loc cit.
26 
2015, Case C-647/15, (2016/C 038/56) 01.02.2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2016.038. 
01.0043.01.ENG.
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in the territory of the Member State in which they 
27 Moreover, Slovakia 
argued in a similar way stressing alleged numerous 
breaches of procedural requirements by the European 
Council as well as the violation of the principle of 
representative democracy, institutional balance and 
sound administration.28
5. Outlook: Potential consequences of 
the controversies for the European 
Union
On July 26, 2017, a general advocate of the Court of 
opinion on the Slovak and Hungarian lawsuit. The 
opinion recommended that the European Court should 
dismiss the lawsuit initiated by Slovakia and Hungary 
against the mechanism of the mandatory relocation 
of asylum seekers and reject all the procedural and 
formal points brought up by Slovakia and Hungary.29 
This opinion signaled the direction, to which the EJC 
would lean, as it in fact did on September 6, 2017. 
The Court dismissed all lawsuits brought by Slovakia 
mechanism actually contributes to enabling Greece 
and Italy to deal with the impact of the 2015 migration 
30 
countries, in particular since both governments of 
Slovakia and Hungary said clearly that they would 
accept the ruling, it does not mean automatically 
they will be willing would to accept the migrant 
and refugee quota assigned to them, as the issue has 
become highly politicized in the domestic politics 
and would go against the anti-migrant sentiments in 
the respective societies. More probable is a symbolic 
acceptance of a very low number of refugees to avoid 
potentially risky consequences for the EU as a whole. 
First of all, the question is in how far the infringement 
run. As the Court of Justice of the European Union 
decided in favor of the EU decision on relocation and 
against the Slovak and Hungarian governments, the 
key arguments of the V4 about the illegality of the 
resettlement decision and procedural violations are 
debunked. This will certainly increase pressure by 
more likely.
On the other hand, there are voices stressing that any 
27 
2015, Case C-647/15, (2016/C 038/56) 01.02.2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2016.038. 
01.0043.01.ENG.
28 
2015, Case C-643/15, (2016/C 038/55), 01.02.2016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2016.038. 
01.0041.01.ENG.
29 Court of Justice of the European Union (CURIA) (2017) Advocate General Bot proposes that the Court should dismiss the actions 
brought by Slovakia and Hungary against the provisional mechanism for the mandatory relocation of asylum seekers. That mechanism 
is actually a proportionate means of enabling Greece and Italy to deal with the impact of the 2015 migration crisis. Advocate General’s 
Opinion in Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 88/17, Luxembourg, 26 July 2017, 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-07/cp170088en.pdf.
30 Court of Justice of the European Union (CURIA) (2017) The Court the provisional mechanism for the mandatory relocation of asylum 
seekers. That mechanism actually contributes to enabling Greece and Italy to deal with the impact of the 2015 migration crisis and 
is proportionate. Judgment in Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 91/17, 
Luxembourg, 6 September 2017, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/ application/pdf/2017-09/cp170091en.pdf.
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an attempt by the EU to punish a member state in 
2000 ended in chaos when diplomatic quasi-sanctions 
were enforced against Austria after the country’s 
conservative party decided to form a coalition 
government with the right—conservative Freedom 
Party (FPÖ). However, the measures were quickly 
dropped after they encouraged anti-EU sentiment in 
Austria and other EU countries. The governments 
of the Central Eastern European countries and the 
populist politicians in the Czech Republic reject 
the European mass-immigration policy calling 
31 as former—and still 
put it publicly asking to his country’s exit from the 
EU over the migration dispute.32 They can rely on 
strong anti-immigration sentiments in their societies. 
This means that sanctions following the infringement 
procedure are likely to produce a further popular 
backlash against the EU in Central Eastern Europe. 
This becomes the more probable, the louder and the 
more often Brussels threatens to cut EU funds to the 
disobedient Eastern member states because of their 
anti-migration policies.
In 2018, the EU risks the next crisis over a blocked 
budget, should the bloc decide to punish the V4 
Central Eastern Europe might classify any sanctions—
or even a talk about sanctions—as an attack on their 
country’s sovereignty33 and as a proof of an alleged 
oppressive nature of the EU. This issue thus could add 
to the already present Euroscepticism in the Central 
Eastern member states. Consequently, even with the 
positive European Court decision, made in September 
2017, the EU will still be between a rock and a hard 
If there was any further need to prove both the 
emotional and the politicized dimension European 
voters ascribe to the issue of irregular mass 
immigration, the action of the Polish Catholic church 
on October 7, 2017 was a sign on the wall. October 
7, 2017 was the Memorial Day of the victory of 
Christian armies over the Islamic armies of the 
Ottoman Empire in the sea battle of Lepanto in 1571. 
On that day 446 years later, the Polish Catholic 
Church organized collective prayers frequented by 
precisely located at the outer borders of Poland, thus 
34 Even though the organizers denied it, 
many observers read the action as an event dedicated 
into the V4 countries by the EU, indirectly including 
31 Alimuddin Usmani: Interview with V oclav Klaus: Quotas are not a protection against immigration, but their exact opposite. 
Visegrad Post, 13 April 2016, https://visegradpost.com/en/2016/04/13/interview-with-vaclav-klaus-quotas-are-not-a-protection-against-
immigration-but- their-exact-opposite/; and Václav Klaus: Former Czech president Klaus: EU elites aim to destroy European society as 
we know it. Valdai Discussion Club, 23.01.2017, http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/klaus-eu-elites-aim-to-destroy-europe/. Cf. Michael 
Brendan Dougherty: Listen to Eastern Europe. EU bureaucrats should hear the message loud and clear: Muslim migration waves are a 
pressing problem, and the public is fed up. , June 19, 2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/448749/eu-sanctions-
punishing-poland-eastern- europe-are-mistaken-muslim-migration-serious.
32 Darren Hunt: ‘It’s time for Czexit!’ Former Czech President blasts Eurocrats for ‘blackmailing’ country: The former Czech Republic 
President has blasted the European Union insisting it is time for the country to exit the bloc. Express, June 15, 2017, http://www.express.
co.uk/news/world/817481/Brexit-latest-Former-Czech-President-Eurocrats-Czexit-European-Union-EU- Poland-Hungary.
33 The Telegraph (2017) EU migration showdown: Divide deepens after Brussels launches legal action against Hungary, Poland and Czech 
Republic, loc cit.
34 BBC World: Poland Catholics hold controversial prayer day on borders, 7 October 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world- 
europe-41538260.
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protest against the formal action of the EU against 
the V4. The action manifested the symbolic and 
politicized dimension of the issue, also with regard 
to the legitimacy of the EU, and in particular of the 
European Commission.
Against this background, the European Commission 
will be well advised to critically take into account 
such popular mobilization and give particular 
topic, including the increasing contextual political 
value of symbolic politics, as well as of the politics of 
populism. The EU is still missing one of the decisive 
emotional level.35 Thus, the European Commission 
should recognize the importance of the particular 
emotional dimension involved with the issue, and to 
be considerate of the multi-level complexity of the 
migration topic when proceeding with the dialogue 
with the V4.
35 See Heinz Kleger and Alois Mueller (eds.) (2011) Religion des Bürgers: Zivilreligion in Amerika und Europa, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2nd 
edition.
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